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Abstract
This note examines social responsibility in a linear bilateral monopoly by incorporating a cost-reducing R&D
investment and investigates an endogenous timing game. We find that in the presence of R&D, the retailer always
adopts social responsibility irrespective of the timing of the game, but the manufacturer adopts only with its leadership
in a sequential game where it can take the first-mover advantage. We also show that two sequential choices will be
subgame perfect equilibria, but the commitment to the social responsibility by manufacturer is a payoff dominance
outcome.
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1. Introduction
The recent topic on the firm’s social responsibility has received increasing attention
from broad research in both empirical and theoretical management economics.1 Numer-
ous studies have also formulated theoretical approaches on the social responsibility in
the fields of business management and applied economics. While most research con-
sidered horizontal models of market competition where the products are substitutes,2
some research examined the vertical model of supply channel where the products are
complements.
Goering (2012, 2014) and Brand and Grothe (2013, 2015) considered a linear bilat-
eral monopoly with the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer, and showed
that the profit-maximizing firm has a strategic motivation to commit social responsibility
to reduce double marginalization problem and thus to increase its own profits. Goering
(2012) and Brand and Grothe (2013) examined the two-part tariff under perfectly coor-
dinated marketing channel and showed that the manufacturer can induce the retailer to
increase total outputs but its rate depends on the firm’s concern on the social responsibil-
ity. Goering (2014) and Brand and Grothe (2015) also considered the sequencing choice
of social responsibility under imperfectly coordinated marketing channel and showed that
a sequential choice of the social responsibility with manufacturer leadership yields higher
profits than those under pure profit maximization.
In this note, we extend their analysis by incorporating a cost-reducing R&D invest-
ment under imperfectly coordinated marketing channel in a linear bilateral monopoly. We
show that the retailer always adopts social responsibility irrespective of whether simulta-
neous game or sequential game, but the manufacturer adopts only with its leadership in
a sequential game. From the strategic viewpoint of the retailer, its social responsibility
can induce the manufacturer to undertake more R&D investment, which will reduce the
wholesale price. However, the manufacturer will adopt social responsibility only when
it is profitable from more R&D investment, which causes higher cost. Thus, the man-
ufacturer will take advantage of its leadership in choosing the social responsibility in a
bilateral monopoly where the choices of the social responsibility are strategic comple-
ments. These findings also imply that the sequential choice on the social responsibility
critically depends on the efficiency of R&D investment of the manufacturer.
We also examine an endogenous timing game, suggested by Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990), and show that two sequential choices will be subgame perfect equilibra, but
the sequential choice of the social responsibility by manufacturer is a payoff dominance
outcome. This finding is also consistent with Brand and Grothe (2015). Hence, we can
conclude that the sequential commitment with manufacturer leadership is robust in a
linear bilateral monopoly relationship with R&D investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
of a linear bilateral monopoly with R&D. Section 3 provides the results under the fixed
timing of the game and Section 4 provides main findings under the endogenous timing
game. Finally, Section 5 concludes and suggests further research directions.
1For the intensive discussions on the practical and academic issues on social responsibility, see Crifo
and Forget (2015) and Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012).
2As for extensive works with strategic motives for social responsibility, Fanti and Buccella (2016)
examined the network effects while Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Liu et al. (2015), Hirose et al.
(2017) and Lee and Park (2018) incorporated environmental concern. See Fanti and Buccella (2016,
2017) and Leal et al. (2018) for more literature on the strategic approaches on social responsibility.
2. Model
We consider a linear demand bilateral monopoly framework where upstream and
downstream monopolists exist, respectively, as a manufacturer and a retailer. The re-
tailer is endowed with constant returns to scale technologies that transform one unit of
input to one unit of output. This input is sold by the manufacturer for the wholesale
price w to produce a final good. The retailer faces the linear (inverse) demand function
p(Q) = a − q and no other cost than the input price w where the trading is conducted
through linear wholesale price contracts.
The manufacturer has a constant marginal cost, however, it invest in R&D to reduce
the initial production costs. In particular, we assume that reducing production costs by
x units requires kx
2
2
as R&D expenditures where k represents the inefficiency of R&D
investment in the followings:
c(q; x) = (c− x)q +
kx2
2
where c < a and k > k(a, c) ≡
3a+ c
8c
>
1
2
to guarantee interior solutions where w > 0 and 0 < x < c.
Then, the manufacturer’s profit πm and the the retailer’s profit πr are given by
πm = wq − c(q; x) (1)
πr = (p− w)q (2)
According to Brand and Grothe (2015), we model social responsibility in the objec-
tive functions of the firms and assume that both firms care for consumer surplus CS
additionally to their own profits πi for i ∈ {m, r}. Thus, the firms’ objective functions
can be rewritten by:
vm = πm + θmCS = wq − c(q; x) + θm
q2
2
(3)
vr = πr + θrCS = (p− w)q + θr
q2
2
(4)
where vm and vr stand for the objectives of the manufacturer and the retailer, and
θi ∈ [0, 1] indicates the weights put on consumer surplus in its objective function. For
θi = 0 the firm operates like a profit maximizer while for θi = 1 the whole consumer
surplus is considered in the firm’s objectives.
The game runs as follows:3 In the first stage, both firms choose its levels of social
concern to maximize its own profits. Given levels of social concern, the manufacturer
chooses the R&D investment in the second stage and then fixes the wholesale price per
quantity in the third stage to maximize its objectives. In the last stage, the retailer sells
the product at the final market to the end-consumers.
3One may consider the reverse order that R&D is implemented in the first stage and then both firms
choose its levels of social concern to maximize its own profits in the second stage. In this case where the
R&D decision takes a long-run process, compared to the decision on social responsibility, the production
cost is deterministic at the stage that the manufacturer decides its social responsibility and production
outputs. Thus, the analysis becomes the same with Brand and Grothe (2015) and thus the strategic
motives of social responsibility toward R&D decisions disappear. We thank to an anonymous referee for
this suggestion.
3. Results
3.1. Exogenous level of social concern
In the last stage, the retailer maximizes its objectives vr by choosing the optimal
quantity q. As a result, we get the following FOC and the optimal quantity q(w) of this
stage:
∂vr
∂q
= a− w − q (2− θr) = 0⇔ q(w) =
a− w
2− θr
(5)
Inserting the retailer’s quantity q(w) into the manufacturer’s objectives results in the
following reduced form expression
vm =
1
2
(
2(a− w)(w − c+ x)
2− θr
+
(a− w)2θm
(2− θr) 2
− kx2
)
(6)
In the second stage, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price w that maximize
its value vm. Solving this problems gives the following equilibrium price:
w(x) =
(a+ c− x) (2− θr)− aθm
4− θm − 2θr
(7)
A few remarks are in order. First, the effect of each firm’s concern on consumer
surplus on the wholesale price is negative and thus, the wholesale price decreases as the
concern on consumer surplus of each firm increases. That is, ∂w
∂θm
< ∂w
∂θr
< 0: the effect of
θm is more significant to the wholesale price. It implies that the strategic motives of social
responsibility will reduce the wholesale price. Second, the wholesale price decreases as
the manufacturer’s R&D investment increases. That is, ∂w
∂x
< 0 and ∂(∂w/∂θi)
∂x
< 0: R&D
outcome will enhance the effect of θi on the wholesale price. It also implies that the
strategic motives of social responsibility for decreasing the wholesale price will depend
critically on the effect on the R&D investment.
Inserting the wholesale price w(x) into (6), we get the following optimization problem
and optimal R&D investment
∂vm
∂x
=
a− c+ x (1− 4k + kθm + 2kθr)
4− θm − 2θr
= 0 ⇔ x∗ =
a− c
∆
(8)
where ∆ = k (4− θm − 2θr) − 1 > 0. Note that the effect of each firm’s concern on
consumer surplus on the R&D investment is positive and thus, the R&D investment
increases as the concern on consumer surplus of each firm increases. That is, ∂x
∂θr
>
∂x
∂θm
> 0.
The optimal R&D investment yields the following equilibrium wholesale price
w∗ =
a (k (2− θm − θr)− 1) + ck (2− θr)
∆
(9)
Inserting the optimal R&D investment x∗ and the wholesale price w∗, which is always
higher or equal to marginal costs, into (1)-(5) results in the equilibrium quantity, price,
profit and payoffs:
q∗ =
(a− c)k
∆
, p∗ =
k (a (3− θm − 2θr) + c)− a
∆
π∗m =
(a− c)2k (k (4− 2θm − 2θr)− 1)
2∆2
, π∗r =
(a− c)2k2 (1− θr)
∆2
v∗m =
(a− c)2k
2∆
, v∗r =
(a− c)2k2 (2− θr)
2∆2
(10)
3.2. Benchmark
As a benchmark, we consider a standard case of pure-profits maximization where
θm = θr = 0. From the outcomes in (10), we obtain the results in the equilibrium
quantity, price, and profit:
qB =
(a− c)k
4k − 1
, pB =
a(3k − 1) + ck
4k − 1
vBm = π
B
m =
(a− c)2k
2(4k − 1)
, vBr = π
B
r =
(a− c)2k2
(4k − 1)2
(11)
3.3. Timing of social concern
In the followings, we examine three cases according to the timing of the firm’s choice
on social concern. In each case, firms choose θi to maximize its own profits, respectively.
3.3.1. Simultaneous choice of social concern
Firms simultaneously decide on their level of social concern θi so as to maximize π
∗
m
and π∗r respectively. Then, we obtain the optimal levels of social concern
θsm = 0, θ
s
r =
1
2k
(12)
It represents that R&D investment can change the outcomes in which the retailer adopts
social responsibility in a simultaneous game. This is contrast to the results in Brand and
Grothe (2015), who showed that both the manufacturer and the retailer do not adopt
social responsibility in a simultaneous game in the absence of R&D where k → ∞. In
our model, the strategic motive of social responsibility by the retailer depends on the
efficiency of R&D investment of the manufacturer. In particular, as the inefficiency of
R&D increases, which causes more R&D investment of the manufacturer, the effect of
decreasing wholesale price is lessen and thus the retailer’s social responsibility decreases.
The resulting profits are, respectively:
πsm =
(a− c)2k
4(2k − 1)
, πsr =
(a− c)2k
8(2k − 1)
(13)
In sum, the retailer chooses positive θr and induces the manufacturer to undertake more
R&D investment, which leads to reduced wholesale price. Compared to the benchmark
case, the profit of both firms increase, but the profit of manufacture is still higher than
that of retailer, i.e., πBr < π
s
r , π
B
m < π
s
m and π
s
r < π
s
m .
3.3.2. Sequential choice of social concern with retailer leadership
Using backward induction, the manufacturer chooses its level of social concern to
maximize its profit π∗m. Then we have the following equilibrium level of social concern
∂π∗m
∂θm
= −
(a− c)2k3θm
∆3
< 0 ⇔ θrlm = 0 (14)
By inserting θrlm(θr) = 0 into the objectives of the retailer, we get the following opti-
mization problem and equilibrium levels of social concern
∂π∗r
∂θr
=
(a− c)2k2(−1 + 2kθr)
(1− 2k(2− θr))3
= 0 ⇔ θrlr =
1
2k
(15)
This finding is the same with simultaneous game in which the strategic motive of social
responsibility by the retailer depends on the efficiency of R&D investment of the manu-
facturer. This is because the reaction of the manufacturer is always to choose θm = 0 in
either sequential choice game with retailer leadership or simultaneous choice game. Thus,
the retailer leadership does not change R&D investment of manufacturer.
The resulting profits are, respectively:
πrlm =
(a− c)2k
4(2k − 1)
, πrlr =
(a− c)2k
8(2k − 1)
(16)
Hence, the results in the sequential choice game with retailer leadership are the same
with those in simultaneous choice game.
3.3.3. Sequential choice of social concern with manufacturer leadership
Using backward induction, the retailer chooses the profit-maximizing level of social
concern.
∂π∗r
∂θr
= −
(a− c)2k2(1 + k(θm − 2θr))
∆3
= 0 ⇔ θr(θm) =
1 + kθm
2k
(17)
In this case, θr depends on θm positively: θr and θm are strategic complements in a
bilateral monopoly. Note that θr is always positive as far as θm in non-negative.
Inserting θr(θm) into the objectives of the manufacturer, we get the following opti-
mization problem and equilibrium levels of social concern
∂π∗m
∂θm
=
(a− c)2k2(1− k(2− 3θm))
8(1− k(2− θm))3
= 0 ⇔ θmlm =
2k − 1
3k
(18)
The sequential choice of firms’ profit-maximizing level of social concern, whereas the
manufacturer determines before the retailer does, yields the following equilibrium values
of θi
θmlm =
2k − 1
3k
, θmlr =
1 + k
3k
(19)
Note that θmlm > 0 if k > 1/2 and θ
ml
m
>
<
θmlr if k
>
<
2. Thus, the efficiency of R&D
investment determines the relative degree of the social concerns. In particular, if k →∞,
the results converge to the outcomes in Brand and Grothe (2015) where R&D investment
could not be undertaken.
The resulting profits are, respectively:
πmlm =
9(a− c)2k
32(2k − 1)
, πmlr =
3(a− c)2k
16(2k − 1)
(20)
Note that πmlm > π
ml
r . It implies that the manufacturer can take the first-mover advan-
tage in the sequential choice game with its leadership in a bilateral monopoly where the
products are complements and the choices of the social responsibility are also strategic
complements. A higher choice of θm encourages the strategic choice of θr, which also en-
courages higher R&D investment. Thus, the sequential choices of the social responsibility
critically depend on the efficiency of R&D investment of the manufacturer. The manufac-
turer can increase total production outputs with lower production costs even though the
wholesale price decreases, but the output effects outweigh the price effects. It also rep-
resents that the double marginalization problem can be softened by the manufacturer’s
social concern.
Proposition 1. In the fixed timing game, the retailer always adopts social responsibility
irrespective of the sequencing of the game, but the manufacturer adopts only under its
leadership.
4. Endogenous Timing Game
We consider an endogenous timing game in the context of Hamilton and Slutsky
(1990).4 Using the equilibrium results in the fixed-timing game, two comparisons are
noteworthy. First, from (13) and (16), we have πsm = π
rl
m and π
s
r = π
rl
r . Thus, both
the manufacturer and the retailer are indifferent between a simultaneous game and a
sequential game with the retailer’s leadership. Second, from (13) and (20), we have
πsm < π
ml
m and π
s
r < π
ml
r for any k >
3a+c
3a+5c
. Thus, in the presence of R&D, a sequential
game with the manufacturer’s leadership is preferable to both firms if the inefficiency of
R&D investment is not too low.
Proposition 2. In the endogenous timing game, (i) both sequential choices are the equi-
libria, but simultaneous choice is not an equilibrium and (ii) a sequential choice with
manufacturer leadership is a payoff dominant equilibrium.
It represents that sequential choices of the social responsibility by the manufacturer’s
leadership increases the manufacturer’s profits as well as the retailer’s profits.5 This
finding also consistent with Brand and Grothe (2015) and thus we can conclude that
the sequential commitment with manufacturer leadership is robust in a linear bilateral
monopoly relationship with R&D investment.
5. Concluding Remarks
We examined the strategic motives of social responsibility in a linear bilateral monopoly
and emphasized its relationship with R&D decision of the manufacturer. We showed that
the retailer always adopts social responsibility irrespective of the timing of the game, but
the manufacturer adopts only with its leadership in a sequential game where the choices
of the social responsibility are strategic complements. We also showed that the sequential
choice on the social responsibility critically depends on the efficiency of R&D investment
of the manufacturer.
As future research, it is needed to examine two-part tariffs under perfectly coordinated
marketing channel and compare with the results under imperfectly coordinated marketing
channel. In this case, as Chen et al. (2016) proposed, a bilateral duopoly model is also
an important research direction. Finally, as Matsumura and Matsushima (2015) worked,
not only the manufacturers but the retailers often engage in R&D investments such as
service innovation and quality management.6 Thus, the interplay between the strategic
motives of social responsibility will be affected by the bargaining power because both the
manufacturer and the retailer can be main players in the game. We leave it as further
research.
4The endogenous timing game in the context of social responsibility was examined by Kopel and
Brand (2012) and Fanti and Buccella (2017). It is also recently expanded to the other context in a mixed
oligopoly. See, for example, Matsumura and Ogawa (2014) and Lee and Xu (2018).
5As Matsumura and Ogawa (2009) showed, note that payoff dominance implies risk dominance in the
endogenous timing game.
6In Appendix, we consider the case that the retailer also undertakes service R&D to promote its sales
and, using a numerical example, show that our findings can be changed.
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Appendix A. The case where the retailer engages in the service R&D of sales
promotion
In this case the retailer faces the linear (inverse) demand function p(Q) = a + y − q
where y is demand-enhancing effect from the service R&D of sales promotion and the
innovative service effort is given by y
2
2
. Then, the retailer’s profit πr becomes
πr = (a+ y − q − w)q −
y2
2
(A.1)
In the last stage, the retailer maximizes its objective vr by choosing the optimal
quantity q. As a result, we get the following optimal quantity q(w) of this stage:
q(w) =
a− w + y
2− θr
(A.2)
Inserting (A.2) in eq.(3) we obtain the following reduced form of the manufacturer’s
objective:
vm =
(a− w + y)2θm
2 (2− θr) 2
+
(−c+ w + x)(a− w + y)
2− θr
−
kx2
2
(A.3)
In the third stage, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price w that maximize its
value vm. Solving this problem gives the following equilibrium price:
w(x, y) =
(a+ c− x+ y) (2− θr)− (a+ y)θm
4− θm − 2θr
(A.4)
Note that the wholesale price increases as the retailer’s R&D in service increases.
That is, ∂w
∂y
> 0.
In the second stage, making use of (A.4), both firms choose, simultaneously and
independently the level of its R&D investment, x and y, that maximizes vm and vr
respectively. Then, we obtain the optimal levels of R&D investment:
x∗ =
(a− c) (4− θm − 2θr)
∆
; y∗ =
(a− c)k (2− θr)
∆
(A.5)
where ∆ = k (14 + θ2m − 4θm (2− θr)− 15θr + 4θ
2
r)− 4 + θm + 2θr. Note that both man-
ufacturer and retailer’s R&D levels increases as the concern on consumer surplus of each
firm increases. That is ∂x
∗
∂θi
> 0 and ∂y
∗
∂θi
> 0.
The optimal R&D investments levels yield the following equilibrium wholesale price
w∗ =
ck (2− θr) (3− θm − 2θr) + a (4− θm − 2θr) (2k − kθm − kθr − 1)
∆
(A.6)
Inserting the optimal R&D investment levels x∗ and y∗ and the wholesale price w∗,
into eq.(1) and (A.1) results in the equilibrium profits:
π∗m =
(a− c)2k (4− θm − 2θr)
2 (4k − 2kθm − 2kθr − 1)
2∆2
;
π∗r =
(a− c)2k2 (2θ2m (1− θr) + (2− θr)
2 (7− 8θr)− 8θm (2− 3θr + θ
2
r))
2∆2
(A.7)
Finally, we examine the timing of social responsibility between the manufacturer and
the retailer in the case that both firms undertake R&D investments. For the sake of easy
comparisons, we will use a numerical example where a = 100 and c = 10 and k = 1 and
compare with our original results.
Table A.1: Optimal levels of social responsibility (θ∗
m
, θ∗
r
)
Timing of social concern Simultaneous choice Retailer leadership Manufacturer leadership
with retailer’s service (0.734, 0.723) (0.738, 0.712) (0.739, 0.723)
original results (0, 0.5) (0, 0.5) (1
3
, 2
3
)
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